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Abstract: The aircraft that flies like an airplane but takes off and lands like a chopper. It has been a 
long, strange trip: the V-22 has been 25 years in development, more than twice as long as the Apollo 
program that put men on the moon. V-22 crashes have claimed the lives of 30 men — 10 times the 
lunar program's toll — all before the plane has seen combat. The Pentagon has put $20 billion into 
the Osprey and expects to spend an additional $35 billion before the program is finished. In exchange, 
the Marines, Navy and Air Force will get 458 aircraft, averaging $119 million per copy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The V-22 Osprey, It was designed for future irregular warfare environment covering full 
scale  of  missions,  especially  in  third-world  conflicts  with  lack  of  infrastructure.  But  its 
operational problems and deployment experience raise serious questions whether the aircraft 
can accomplish the full range of missions of the helicopter it was intended to replace, or the 
range of missions provided by other modern helicopters. 
The Osprey provides a multi-mission, multi-service versatility. It is capable of carrying 
24 combat-equipped personnel or a 15,000-pound external load. It also has a strategic self-
deployment  capability  with  2,100  nautical  mile  range  with  a  single  aerial  refueling.  Its 
vertical/short takeoff and landing capability allows it to operate as a helicopter for takeoff, 
hover and landing. Once airborne, the engine nacelles rotate forward 90 degrees, converting 
the  V-22  within  20  seconds  into  a  high-speed,  high-altitude  (25,000  feet),  fuel-efficient 
turbo-prop aircraft. 
The V-22 program began in the early 1980s, based on the XV-15 tilt-rotor prototype 
developed by Bell Helicopter and first flown in 1977. The whole program has been revised 
numerous times over its history and the aircraft has experienced a number of development 
challenges relating  to  affordability,  safety,  and program  management.  The  George  H.W. 
Bush Administration proposed terminating the V-22 program in 1989 as part of its proposed 
FY1990 budget. 
The cancellation efforts were through 1992, but Congress rejected these proposals and 
kept the V-22 program alive. 
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Finally, after more than 20 years of development, the MV-22 made its maiden combat 
flight when deployed to Iraq in October 2007 while CV-22 was declared fully operational in 
March 2009. 
2. MISSIONS 
The  V-22  was  projected  for  vast  scale  of  combat  or  non-combat  missions  from  peace 
evacuation  operations,  humanitarian  assistance  and  disaster-relief  mission  to  assault 
transport, medevac, aeroscout, tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel, raids conducting  
and support of widely dipersed units. 
The Marine Corps are the lead service in the development of the Osprey. The Marine 
Corps version, the MV-22, will be an assault transport for troops, equipment and supplies 
and will be capable of operating from ships or from expeditionary airfields ashore. The 
Navy's HV-22A will provide combat search and rescue, delivery and retrieval of special 
warfare teams along with fleet logistic support transport. The Air Force CV-22A is built for 
conducting long-range special operations missions.[1] 
3. FINANCIAL RELATIONS 
Like some other aircraft, the number of V-22s projected for production has reduced over 
time. First order in 1989 was set on 663 aircraft. Now the Department of Defense (DoD) 
plans call for procuring a total of 458 V-22s—360 MV-22s for the Marine Corps; 50 CV-22 
special operations versions for U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM (funded 
jointly by the Air Force and USSOCOM); and 48 HV-22s for the Navy. No HV-22s have yet 
been procured for the Navy.  
V-22s are currently being procured under a $10.4 billion, multiyear procurement (MYP) 
arrangement covering the period FY2008-FY2012 (Fiscal Year). The MYP contract, which 
was awarded on March 28, 2008, covers the procurement of 167 aircraft—141 MV-22s and 
26 CV-22s [2]. DoD expects the multiyear contract to save $427 million when compared to 
the use annual contracting. [3] 
DoD  in  February  2008  estimated  the  total  acquisition  cost  of  a  458-aircraft  V-22 
program at about $53.3 billion in then-year dollars, including about $9.9 billion for research 
and  development,  about  $43.1  billion  for  procurement,  and  $262  million  for  Military 
Construction (MilCon). The program was estimated to have a program acquisition unit cost, 
or PAUC (which is total acquisition cost divided by the number of aircraft), of about $116.3 
million and an average procurement unit cost, or APUC (which is procurement cost divided 
by the number of aircraft), of about $94.5 million. [4] 
In addition, operations and support costs are expected to rise. The current cost per flying 
hour is over 11,000$ - more than double the target estimate for MV-22. [5] 
4. ACCIDENTS 
Like other types of aircraft during development, testing or the operational phase didn`t avoid 
several  crashes  and  fatalities.  There  were  five  crashes  and  several  notable  incidents 
enregistered till the end of 2010. 
1.  11 June, 1991 - An Osprey crashed three minutes into its maiden demonstration 
flight at a Boeing helicopter flight test center in Wilmington, DE. There were no 
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members safely ejected, and the aircraft was badly damaged the accident.  
2.  20 July, 1992 - Seven crewmembers lost their lives when a prototype of the V-22 
Osprey fell into waters off the Quantico, VA, Marine Corps Air Station. The crash 
occurred after an engine caught fire as the aircraft was completing a 700-mile non-
stop  flight  from  Eglin  Air  Force  Base.  mechanical  failure  was  found  to  have 
triggered  a  fire  that  disabled  an  engine.  The  identified  design  deficiencies  were 
corrected and incorporated in all production aircraft.  
3.  08 April, 2000 - An MV-22 crashed during a noncombatant evacuation evaluation 
mission. The crash claimed 19 lives -- the deadliest air disaster for the Marines since 
22 died in a helicopter crash in 1989. The Osprey was one of four flying from 
Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Ariz. It crashed at Marana Airport near Tucson. 
The  mishap  aircraft  was one  of  five  production  aircraft  delivered  to  the Marine 
Corps for operational use. Officials said that an examination of data did not indicate 
any mechanical or software failures. In the last seconds of its flight, the mishap 
aircraft was in a high rate of descent at a relatively low forward airspeed. These 
characteristics can lead to a condition known as power settling (or vortex ring state) 
which can result in a loss of lift on the rotor system. Power settling is a phenomenon 
common to helicopter flight. The primary cause of the crash was the pilot descended 
too quickly -- 250 percent the acceptable rate.  
4.  11 December, 2000 - An MV-22 Osprey crashed in North Carolina during a night 
training mission. Four Marines were killed when the MV-22 crashed in a remote 
wooded area about 10 miles outside Jacksonville. The crash was the fourth accident 
involving the tilt-rotor aircraft since 1991. The Navy and Marine Corps grounded all 
MV-22 Osprey flights until further notice. The accident investigation concluded that 
a leak in a chafed hydraulic line, coupled with a software glitch, had caused the 
crash. The software problem contributed to the aircraft going out of control, rather 
than compensating for the hydraulic leak. [6] 
5.  April 8, 2010 - a CV-22 Osprey, crashed approximately 11km west of Qalat city in 
Zabul  province  in  southern  Afghanistan  attempting  a  night  landing  at  a  desert 
landing zone. This was the first loss of CV-22 in combat. Two of the three cockpit 
crew members — pilot and flight engineer died. The co-pilot who survived, told the 
invetigators, that he didn’t have a clear memory of the flight’s last 30 seconds. Also 
killed  were  a  soldier  and  a  contractor  —  two  of  16  passengers  in  the  cargo 
compartment. A Taliban spokesmen claimed responsibility for shooting down the 
Osprey helicopter, however, enemy fire, brownout or engine failure have been ruled 
out by the USAF investigation. The true causes of the crash may never be known 
because  no  irrefutable  evidence  exists  to  substantiate  either  explanation  -  the 
wreckage and black box recorder were destroyed. [7] 
5. LIMITS & EXPERIENCE 
The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) claimed that the V-22 along with the H-53K 
are  “particularly  limited”  in  their  ability  to  perform  vertical  extraction  of  patients  and 
rescuers  since  they  “do  not  have  a  hoist  or  are  not  practical  options  for  hoisting  live 
personnel due to excessive downwash.” This feature is critical for rescue aircraft which often 
cannot land at rescue sites. [8] 
V-22 operational tests and training exercises identified challenges in maneuvering limits 
that  affect  air  crew  ability  to  execute  correct  evasive  actions.  Moreover,  due  the  large Tomáš SCHÓBER, Matúš GREGA, Pavel NEČAS  90 
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footprint the Osprey is restricted in the number of places it can land. This can pose serious 
troubles in urban environment, forested terrain or on shipboard. Identified challenges could 
limit the ability to conduct worldwide operations. Worse, safe engine-out landing is a major 
unresolved issue for the V-22. Emergency landing after the sudden failure of both engines in 
the Conversion / Vertical Take-Off and Landing modes below 1,600 feet altitude are not 
likely to be survivable. The V-22 cannot autorotate to a safe landing. [9] 
In conjunction with resuming flight testing, the Navy Department modified certain V-22 
requirements. For instance, the V-22 is no longer required to land in helicopter mode without 
power  (also  known  as  “autorotation”),  protection  from  nuclear,  chemical  and  biological 
weapons  has  been  eliminated.  The  V-22  is  no  longer  required  to  have  an  “air  combat 
maneuvering” capability; instead it must demonstrate “defensive maneuvering.” Also, the 
requirement that troops be able to use a rope or rope ladder to exit the cabin at low altitudes 
has been eliminated. [10] 
As of January 2009, the 12 MV-22s in Iraq successfully completed all missions assigned 
in a low threat theater of operations—using their enhanced speed and range to engage in 
general support missions and deliver personnel and internal cargo faster and further than the 
legacy helicopters being replaced. In addition, the MV-22’s ability to fly at higher altitudes 
in airplane mode enabled it to avoid the threat of small arms fire during its Iraq deployment. 
This  agility  allowed the Osprey  to  operate  at  far  lower  operational risk  while  at  higher 
tempo. Three Marine Corps squadrons that have been deployed to Iraq have flown over 9800 
hours while executing more than 6000 sorties, carrying over 45,000 passengers and lifting 
2.2 million pounds of cargo without lost a single of these aircraft in combat. The Osprey has 
shown that it can carry an operational load of 24 combatloaded Marines out to a combat 
radius of 300 nautical miles at altitudes above the small arms and rocket-propelled grenade 
threat envelope. On the other hand, the Marine Corps admit that during the deployment in 
Iraq, Osprey was restricted to a very limited role due to its vulnerability to hostile fire, its 
lack of maneuverability and its unreliability in the heat and sand of Iraq. 
Experience from deployment shown need for a new upgrade program. Unfortunately, 
planned upgrades to the aircraft could affect the aircraft’s ability to meet its requirements. A 
limited-coverage,  ramp-mounted  defensive  weapon  was  installed  on  aircraft  deployed  to 
Iraq. The program plans to incorporate a mission-configurable, belly-mounted defensi-ve 
weapon system that will provide fuller coverage. For missions requiring the new weapon, 
however, the interior space needed to integrate the system will reduce the MV-22’s troop 
carrying capability below its key performance parameter of 24 troops, as well as reduce its 
internal cargo capacity. The program also plans to integrate an all-weather radar into the 
MV-22. This radar and an effective de-icing system are essential for self-deploying the MV-
22 without a radar-capable escort and deploying the V-22 to areas such as Afghanistan, 
where  icing  conditions  are  more  likely  to  be  encountered.  However,  expected  weight 
increases from  these and other  upgrades, as  well  as  general  weight  increase  for  heavier 
individual body armor and equipment may affect the MV-22’s ability to maintain the key 
performance parameters, such as speed, range, and troop carrying capacity. 
While  in  Iraq,  the  MV-22  also  conducted  a  few  AeroScout  raid  and  external  lift 
missions. These types of missions were infrequent, but those that were carried out were 
successfully  completed.  Such  missions,  however,  were  also  effectively  carried  out  by 
existing helicopters. AeroScout missions are made by a combination of medium-lift aircraft 
and attack helicopters. Participating in these missions, the MV-22 was limited by operating 
with slower legacy helicopters—thus negating its speed and range advantages. Similarly, 
external lift missions do not leverage the advantages of the V-22. In fact, most of Marine 91  Osprey – war for its own existence 
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equipment requiring external transport is cleared only for transit at speeds under 150 knots 
calibrated airspeed (kcas), which is in the contrary with higher speeds at which the MV-22 
can  travel  with  internal  cargo  or  passengers.  According  to  Iraq-based  MV-22  squadron 
leaders, the CH-53, which is capable of lifting heavier external loads, was more readily 
available than the MV-22 to carry out those missions and therefore was generally called on 
for those missions, allowing the MV-22 to be used more extensively for missions that exploit 
its own comparative strengths. [12] 
The  MV-22’s  Iraq  experience  has  also  demonstrated  some  limitations  in  situational 
awareness that challenge operational effectiveness. Crew chiefs and troops pointed out on 
lack of visibility outside to the activity on the ground from the V-22’s troop cabin as a result 
of small windows. The combination with brownout (reduced flight vidibility due to airborne 
particles, especially from helicopter downwash) caused by the tiltrotor`s powerful downwash 
was considered to be a significant disadvantage. Another key upgrades concerning the war 
experience are adding forward firing countermeasures to enhance the aircraft`s survivability, 
modifying  the  engine  air  particle  separator  to  prevent  engine  fires  and  improve  system 
reliability. 
6. SELF DEFENCE 
Back in 2007 and prior to the type’s first operational deployment, the USMC decided the 
aircraft  needed  a  self-defence  capability  to  supplement  the  machine  gun  fitted  to  the 
aircraft’s rear ramp. The US Marine Corps operated a ramp-mounted. 50-calibre gun on 10 
MV-22 Ospreys deployed to Iraq, but this configuration limited the weapon to firing on only 
rearward targets. At the time, BAE Systems were developing the Remote Guardian System, 
a belly-mounted turret fitted with a 7.62mm mini-gun that could fold into the fuselage while 
on the ground but slide down under the belly of the aircraft during flight.[5]  
The gun is operated from inside the aircraft by using a controller. The operator can 
rotate the gun 360°and acquire targets using a monitor that is fed colour images from a 
forward-looking infrared sensor. But after using the gun with some success in Afghanistan, 
recent  reports  say  the  marines  are  ditching  the  gun  system  as  the  drawbacks  frequently 
outweigh its benefits. At 363kg the gun is heavy and this limits the payload the aircraft can 
lift in Afghanistan’s hot and high altitude environment. It can also cause nausea for the 
crewman  operating  the  system  since  they  must  stare  at  the  screen  while  the  aircraft 
manoeuvres. United States Air Force (USAF) and USMC say they are now looking for a 
long-term solution. The future system should be perhaps installed in the nose of the aircraft 
or in the hell hole.  
7. STEPS TO FUTURE 
Every new design is struggling with problems such as unreliable component parts and supply 
chain  weaknesses,  which  led  to  higher  operations  and  support  costs  and  low  aircraft 
availability rates. The V-22 is not an exception. The deployments confirmed that the V-22’s 
enhanced speed and range enable personnel and internal cargo to be transported faster and to 
extended ranges than is possible by the helicopters it is replacing. On the other hand, lack of 
autorotation  capability  makes  the  aircraft  vulnerable  especially  during  final  approach  to 
landing. The low-threat missions assigned to Ospreys in Iraq were accomplished at high 
level. However, questions have risen whether V-22 is the best suited to accomplish the full 
mission repertoire of the helicopters it is intended to replace, as the current Marine Corps Tomáš SCHÓBER, Matúš GREGA, Pavel NEČAS  92 
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plan is to replace all of its medium-lift helicopters with the MV-22. The question is whether 
mixed fleet of MV-22s and legacy helicopters would be better. Warfare needs indicate, that 
the V-22 may not be best suited for the full range of missions requiring medium lift, as the 
aircraft’s speed cannot be exploited over shorter distances or when transporting external 
cargo. In addition, attack escort helicopters are not be able to keep pace with the Osprey. 
Over the years, the aircraft has been the subject of controversy for development delays, 
highly  publicized  crashes,  and  many  funding  debates.  Osprey  has  strong  supporters  but 
equally tough critics, both sides claiming that it is either better or worse than conventional 
helicopter  alternatives.  Those  favoring  the  program  cite  its  speed,  range,  and  altitude 
advantages over helicopters, characteristics that make it possible for Marine Corps forces to 
execute operations from increased distances. Those against the program cite its troubled 
developmental history and its high cost (relative to helicopters). Moreover less expensive 
helicopters can just as effectively support ship-to-shore deployments, amphibious landing 
operations, and various amphibious assault missions. 
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